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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Randall Jerome Billups appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of conspiracy to traffic heroin.  On appeal, Billups 
challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. 
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
 Detective Kyle Ludwig responded to a call for service from the Postal 
Annex after it received a package containing heroin.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.4, Ls.13-
15.)  Employees at the Postal Annex advised Detective Ludwig that packages to 
the addressee were “typically picked up” by a “white female” “immediately” after 
the packages arrived.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.5, Ls.4-8.)  Detective Ludwig instructed 
the postal staff to deliver the package “as they normally would.”  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., 
p.5, Ls.8-10.)   
 Detective Ludwig was notified once the package was collected from the 
Postal Annex, after which he attempted to locate the car the “white female” was 
driving when she picked it up.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.6, Ls.7-16.)  That car 
“relocated” from the annex to a nearby parking lot.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.6, Ls.11-
20.)  The car was parked by a dumpster in that parking lot for a very brief period 
before leaving.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.6, L.21 – p.7, L.1.)  Law enforcement “lost the 
vehicle” for a “short period of time” before relocating it, at which time Detective 
Ludwig conducted a traffic stop.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.7, Ls.2-21.)   
 There were two occupants in the car when Detective Ludwig made 
contact with it.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.7, L.23 – p.8, L.2, p.9, Ls.14-15.)  Billups was 
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the passenger, and Alex Hoffman was the driver; Hoffman was also one of two 
registered owners on the post office box to which the heroin package was 
delivered.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.5, Ls.13-16, p.9, Ls.12-13.)  Detective Ludwig could 
see inside the vehicle and noticed portions of the heroin package he previously 
identified at the Postal Annex sitting on the center console.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.8, 
Ls.10-18.)  Following a positive canine alert, a search of the car uncovered a 
digital scale and a “pay/owe ledger sheet” inside a bag that was sitting on the 
passenger side floorboard.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.8, L.19 – p.9, L.11.)  The ledger 
included a reference to Billups.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.15, Ls.11-17.)  Although the 
heroin was not found in the car, it was subsequently discovered in an area 
search of “trash bins.”  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.9, L.22 – p.10, L.9.)   
 “Based on the items recovered in the vehicle,” and Detective Ludwig’s 
“knowledge of the contents of the package from the Postal Annex,” Detective 
Ludwig had Billups and Hoffman “transported to the Meridian Police Department 
for further questioning.”  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.10, Ls.17-24.)  At the police 
department, Detective Ludwig read Billups Miranda1 warnings after which Billups 
“admitted . . . that he was a heroin user; that he knew that he was travelling with 
Ms. Hoffman to pick up the package of heroin and that he would assist Ms. 
Hoffman in the sale of that heroin,” and “would be paid with heroin” as a “kick[ ] 
down” for “setting up the deals.”  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.12, L.6 – p.13, L.4.)        
The state charged Billups with conspiracy to traffic in heroin.  (R., pp.41-
43, 51-53.)  Billups filed a motion to suppress “all evidence, physical and 
                                            
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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testimonial, obtained or derived from or through or as a result of [his] unlawful 
search, seizure, interrogation, arrest, and detention.”  (R., pp.101-102.)  Billups 
argued suppression was proper because he was “illegally detained . . . without 
an arrest or search warrant.”  (R., p.102.)  The district court denied Billups’ 
suppression motion.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.27, L.1 – p.31, L.19.)     
The jury found Billups guilty of the charged offense.  (R., p.200.)  The 
court imposed the mandatory minimum fixed ten year sentence.  (R., pp.203-







Billups states the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Billups’s motion 
to suppress? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.7) 
 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
 Has Billups failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress because the evidence shows there was probable cause to arrest 
Billups when he was transported to the police department where he made the 






Billups Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion 
Because The Evidence Supports The Conclusion That There Was Probable 
Cause To Arrest Billups When He Was Transported To The Police Department 
Where He Made The Incriminating Statements He Sought To Suppress 
 
A. Introduction 
 Billups challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that 
“officers seized [him] without probable cause and took him to the police station, 
in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)  Billups’ 
argument fails because the evidence presented at the suppression hearing 
supports the conclusion that there was probable cause to arrest Billups when he 
was transported to the police station for further questioning.  The district court’s 
denial of Billups’ motion to suppress should, therefore, be affirmed. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the 
court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found.”  State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 
C. Billups Was Not Entitled To Suppression Because There Was Probable 
Cause To Arrest Him At The Time Of His Detention 
 
Generally, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must 
be supported by probable cause.  Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 
(1981); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).  “Reasonable or 
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probable cause for an arrest exists where the officer possesses information that 
would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an 
honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested is guilty.”  State v. Buti, 131 
Idaho 793, 798, 964 P.2d 660, 665 (Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted).  The 
evaluation of probable cause “must take into account the factual and practical 
consideration of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act.”  Id.  “In determining whether there is probable cause for an 
arrest, an officer is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the available 
information in light of the knowledge that he has gained from his previous 
experience and training.”  Id.  Probable cause does not require an actual 
showing of criminal activity, but only the “probability or substantial chance” of 
such activity.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244-245 n.13 (1983).  The probable 
cause standard necessary for an arrest “must be distinguished from the burden 
of proof that is borne by the State at trial” because “[t]he adequacy of probable 
cause is not measured against the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that is required for conviction.”  State v. Zentner, 134 Idaho 508, 510, 5 
P.3d 488, 490 (Ct. App. 2000).      
 Application of the law to the facts established at the suppression hearing 
supports the conclusion that Detective Ludwig had probable cause to arrest 
Billups when he took Billups to the police station for further questioning.  When 
Detective Ludwig ordered Billups’ transport, he was aware of the following 
information:  (1) Billups was with Hoffman when she picked up a package 
containing heroin from the Postal Annex; (2) a portion of that package, which 
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had been opened, was on the center console when Hoffman’s vehicle was 
stopped shortly after leaving the Postal Annex; (3) a digital scale and a ledger 
that included a reference to Billups were discovered inside a bag on the 
passenger side floorboard near where Billups was sitting; and (4) although the 
heroin itself was not in the car at the time of the traffic stop, the car had been 
seen parked temporarily next to a dumpster shortly after the package was picked 
up from the Postal Annex, and the officers briefly lost sight of the car before the 
traffic stop was effectuated, which would have given Billups and Hoffman time to 
discard the heroin if they realized that the package had already been opened 
before it was picked up and/or realized they were being followed.  (Supp. Hrg. 
Tr., p.6, L.10 – p.7, L.9, p. 8, L.19 – p.9, L.11, p.15, Ls.11-17.)  At a minimum, 
this was sufficient “information that would lead a person of ordinary care and 
prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion” that Billups was 
guilty of criminal conduct in relation to the heroin and/or paraphernalia.  Maryland 
v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), is instructive.   
In Pringle, police stopped a car with three people in it.  Id. at 368.  They 
searched the car after obtaining consent from the driver and found a large 
amount of cash in a roll in the glove compartment and baggies of cocaine tucked 
behind the folded-up armrest in the back seat.  Id.  After all three men in the car 
denied knowledge of the drugs and cash, officers arrested all three.  Id. at 368-
69.  Pringle, the front-seat passenger, later admitted that the drugs and cash 
were his.  Id.  After being convicted, Pringle appealed the denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence, asserting officers lacked probable cause to arrest him.  Id. at 
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369.  The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed and held that, “absent specific facts 
tending to show Pringle’s knowledge and dominion or control over the drugs, the 
mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was a front seat 
passenger in a car being driven by its owner is insufficient to establish probable 
cause for an arrest for possession.”  Id. at 369 (internal quotes and brackets 
omitted).  However, this analysis was unanimously rejected by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.  Id. at 370-74.   
The Supreme Court reiterated that probable cause deals with 
“probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances” and consists of a 
“reasonable ground for belief of guilt” that is “particularized with respect to the 
person to be searched or seized.”  Id. at 371 (internal quotes omitted).  “Finely 
tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a 
preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the 
probable-cause decision.”  Id. (internal quotes and brackets omitted).  It 
reasoned that the presence of cocaine and a significant amount of cash in the 
car where it was accessible to all three occupants, in combination with the three 
occupants having provided no information as to ownership of the cash or 
cocaine, created “an entirely reasonable inference … that any or all three of the 
occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the 
cocaine.”  Id. at 373. 
Zentner is also instructive.  In Zentner, an officer initiated a traffic stop 
after observing a car with two broken taillights.  134 Idaho at 509, 5 P.3d at 489.  
Although the officer turned on her overhead lights in an effort to stop the car, the 
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driver continued traveling while the “occupants were moving around excessively.”  
Id.  The driver eventually stopped, but “could not produce a driver’s license, proof 
of insurance or a vehicle registration.”  Id.  Further investigation revealed that the 
license plates on the car were registered to a different automobile, and that one 
of the passengers had a stun gun.  Id.  “Due to the stun gun information,” the 
officer frisked one of the occupants and discovered “he had a bag of dope in his 
pocket.”  Id.  After arresting that individual, the officer “noticed a bag containing a 
powder substance in a hole in the front dashboard.”  Id.  Zentner, who was sitting 
in the backseat, was removed from the vehicle and frisked, but the officer “did 
not find anything on his person, and he was not arrested” at that time.  Id.  
However, after a subsequent search of the car uncovered the bag in the 
dashboard, which contained methamphetamine, a “dollar bill rolled up into a tube 
shape in the glove box and a backpack on the backseat that contained scales 
with a white powder residue and nine baggies containing methamphetamine,” 
Zentner was arrested for possession of methamphetamine and paraphernalia.  
Id.  A search incident to Zentner’s arrest revealed he had methamphetamine 
concealed in his sock.  Id.   
“Zentner filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine found during 
the post-arrest search at the jail.”  Zentner, 134 Idaho at 509, 5 P.3d at 489.  
Zentner “argued that he had been unlawfully arrested without probable cause 
and that the methamphetamine was found as a result of the unlawful arrest.”  Id.  
On appeal, Zentner further argued that “probable cause was lacking because he 
was not the sole occupant of the vehicle and there was nothing in the backpack 
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indicating that the backpack or the drugs belonged to him as distinguished from 
the driver or the other passenger.”  Id. at 510, 5 P.3d at 490.  The Court rejected 
this argument, reasoning: 
The facts known to the officers at the time of Zentner’s 
arrest include not only the proximity of the backpack to Zentner as 
he was situated in the backseat of the vehicle, but also Deputy 
Knisley’s observation, while attempting to stop the vehicle, that all 
three occupants were moving excessively about the interior of the 
car for a period before the driver finally brought the vehicle to a 
stop.  From this excessive activity, followed by the discovery of 
drugs in the automobile, an officer could reasonably infer that all of 
the occupants had been taking steps to conceal the contraband in 
the car.  This evidence, together with Zentner’s physical position on 
the seat next to the backpack, would lead a prudent person to 
entertain an honest and strong suspicion that Zentner had 
knowledge and control of the contraband in the backpack.  
Although the evidence might have been insufficient to convict 
Zent[n]er for possession of the drugs in the backpack, it was 
adequate to create probable cause for his arrest. 
 
Zentner, 134 Idaho at 511, 5 P.3d at 491 (emphasis original).   
Similar to the defendants in Pringle and Zentner, Billups’ presence in the 
car, and his proximity to the heroin package and the paraphernalia, which 
included a ledger referencing him, was sufficient to establish probable cause to 
believe Billups had both knowledge and dominion and control over the package 
that had contained the heroin, and/or the paraphernalia in the bag located on the 
floorboard at his feet, and probable cause to believe that he facilitated disposal 
of the heroin prior to the traffic stop.  Although the evidence at that time may 
have been less than that required for proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even a 
preponderance, it  was certainly a reasonable inference for officers to conclude 
that persons present in the car at the time the heroin was picked up from the 
Postal Annex would have knowledge of the heroin and of the paraphernalia 
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associated with heroin sales that was discovered in the car.  The police did not 
have to assume that Billups was oblivious to the drug activity around him.  
Because officers had probable cause to arrest Billups when he was handcuffed 
and transported to the police department for questioning, Billups’ subsequent 
statements and the text messages found on his phone were not subject to 
suppression.   
On appeal, Billups contends he was entitled to suppression because, he 
argues, he was seized “without probable cause.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)  In 
support of his argument, Billups indicates that he “agrees with the State’s 
concession, and the district court’s finding, that officers had no probable cause to 
arrest him until after he provided the incriminating evidence” and argues that the 
district court’s “finding that officers did not need to have probable cause to detain 
him and transport him involuntarily to the police station is directly in contradiction 
to United States Supreme Court precedent.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.9 (citing Supp. 
Hrg. Tr., p.23, L.1 – p.24, L.5; p.27, L.1 – p.31, L.2).)  The state agrees that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Dunaway supports Billups’ assertion that he was 
effectively arrested when he was handcuffed and transported to the police 
department for questioning.  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-10 (citing Dunaway, 442 
U.S. 200).)  However, because there was probable cause to arrest Billups at that 
time, there was no Fourth Amendment violation that would entitle him to 
suppression of the statements, or other incriminating evidence, he provided 
following his de facto arrest.  This is true even if the prosecutor did not believe 
there was probable cause, and even if the district court erroneously concluded 
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there was reasonable suspicion but not probable cause.  See State v. Newman, 
149 Idaho 596, 600 n.1, 237 P.3d 1222, 1226 n.1 (Ct. App. 2010) (“on appeal, 
this Court is not limited by the prosecutor’s argument or the absence thereof” in 
relation to a suppression motion); State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 281, 108 P.3d 
424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005) (although factual findings are accepted if supported by 
substantial evidence, whether the evidence satisfies the probable cause 
standard is reviewed de novo).  As to Billups’ latter argument, that the district 
court found a lack of probable cause, that assertion is contradicted by the district 
court’s statement that “[t]here was probable cause to detain both Ms. Hoffman 
and Mr. Billups for an investigatory investigation.”  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.30, Ls.2-4.)  
Although the district court followed this statement with a finding that “[t]here was 
a reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed,” it is 
unclear whether that statement was directed toward the initial basis for the stop 
as opposed to Billups’ arrest.  (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.30, Ls.4-9; see also p.31, Ls.10-
13.)  Even if the district court did not mean “probable cause” when it used the 
words “probable cause,” because the probable cause determination is subject to 
free review, and because the existence of probable cause was placed squarely 
before the court in Billups’ suppression motion (R., pp.101-102; see also p.111),  
the district court’s phraseology is ultimately irrelevant.  For the reasons already 
stated, the probable cause standard was satisfied in this case.  Billups has failed 
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 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the 
denial of Billups’ motion to suppress. 
 DATED this 4th day of November, 2016. 
 
       
  __/s/ Jessica M. Lorello___ 
 JESSICA M. LORELLO 
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2 The state agrees with Billups that the Miranda warnings preceding his 
statements would not cure any Fourth Amendment violation that would require 
suppression of those statements.  Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218-219.  The state 
also concedes that, if Billups’ statements should have been suppressed, any 
error in admission of those statements at trial would not be harmless.   
